Volume LXI CHICAGO, JULY 9, 1908 Number 19

UNITY

Freedom, Fellowship and Character in Religion

Official Organ of the Congress of Religion

The reading of the Rev. Margaret T. Olmstead's note of appreciation for the Seven Years' Course in Religion, as outlined and taught to those who assemble each summer at Tower Hill, prompts me to send a word from our Kansas City corps of teachers and Sunday-school workers. They have been pursuing this course with me the last five years and are most enthusiastic, since they consider it as giving the most comprehensive view of religion as a whole. A saying which has become axiomatic with us is, "When we shall have completed our Seven Years' Course in Religion we shall be able to give a sane reason for the faith within us."

Many outside of our Sunday-school have become interested in the course. The Bible class of the largest women's club in the city for the last two years has devoted its summers to this course of study as pursued by our school the winters previous.

If the next year's work in the New Testament makes for us the revelations which the last two years' study of the Old Testament and the Apocrapha did, the Bible will have ceased to be shelved by our Sunday-school boys and girls and will have become one of the working books for those who grapple with every day problems.

MARY E. ANDREWS.

Kansas City, Mo., June 30, 1908.

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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL—
Notes 291
A Fourth of July Speech that Was Not Made..... 292
THE PULPIT—
The Present Status of the Pragmatic Movement—G. R. Dodson 293
A Voice from the Pews..... 299
THE FIELD—
Foreign Notes—M. E. H.....

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

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UNITY

"HE HATH MADE OF ONE ALL NATIONS OF MEN."

VOLUME LXI THURSDAY, JULY 9, 1908 NUMBER 19

When the Birds Go North Again

Oh, every year hath its winter,
And every year hath its rain—
But a day is always coming
When the birds go north again.

When new leaves swell in the forest,
And grass springs green on the plain,
And the alder's veins turn crimson—
When the birds go north again.

Oh, every heart hath its sorrow,
And every heart hath its pain—
But a day is always coming
When the birds go north again.

'Tis the sweetest thing to remember
If courage be on the wane,
When the cold, dark days are over—
Why, the birds go north again.

—*Ella Higginson.*

As intimated last week, UNITY'S *sanctum* and counting room have made the transition from noisy Chicago to the shady quiet of Tower Hill. All communications, editorial or otherwise, should until further notice be addressed to Spring Green, Wis.

Oliver Herford is a philosopher as well as an artist. In his mythological zoo in the July *Century* he cheerfully reflects:

"We only have, I'm glad to say,
Two kinds of human birds today—
Women and warriors, who still
Wear feathers when dressed up to kill."

Dr. Shrady's concluding paper on "Gen. Grant's Last Days," in the July *Century,* moves the reader with impressive solemnity. There is something sublime in the way the great commander conducted the final campaign and confronted and conquered the last enemy. Day by day he watched the movement of the relentless battalions. At this distance the dogmatism is eliminated out of the contest that raged at the time in newspaper columns and in pulpit: was the sudden change for the better attributable to the good bishop's prayer or the good physician's hypodermic injection? Alas! neither did enough to lay the foundations of much claim or much recrimination. And surely both did something. Let us be grateful for the little "something." The uplift of spirit that brought the smile and the "thank you" had their service to perform on the firing line as did the surgeon's syringe.

It's a very simple little story, with as simple but effective illustration, that appears in the *American Magazine* for July under the title of "The Follies of Fashion," but it is a lesson well taught, a sermon well preached. And we wish every reader of UNITY and still more the high-stepping "gents" and "ladies" who have no time to read UNITY, might read and ponder. Alas, how many hearts have yearned for "spring heel shoes," but when yearning reaches realization have found that now high heels are "just the thing." We must make room for the spelling and language lesson: "Sta-tion, station—a stopping place. *The boy went to the station.* Pas-sion, passion—a strong emotion. *The girl was in a passion.* Fash-ion, fashion—something you want very badly, but when you get it it's something else. *Shoes with heels are all the fashion.*"

The July *Delineator* raises a timely note of warning against the demoralizing danger of the penny arcades and five-cent theaters in our cities. They fill a popular demand if not a popular need, a cheap, quiet, and easily accessible diversion. They represent a scientific achievement surprising and creditable. They cannot be done away with; they must be directed and elevated. It is too big a task for private enterprise. This is a job that belongs to the library and educational boards of a great city. It is another call for the "higher combines." In most of our cities, our library and school boards are often playing at cross purposes, they generally play their games quite independent of one another; they are mutually jealous of interference. Not until they are merged into a dignified body that has in charge the whole educational life of the community, which will include lectures, libraries, reading rooms, schools, dramatic, literary, musical and scenic entertainments will there come such co-ordination of parts as will eliminate the waste and conserve the resources of the community. Combination has come in the lower realms. Let the higher combinations be hastened.

We are in receipt of a curious and interesting document, a fac simile of the license and bond issued by and to Abraham Lincoln, William F. Berry and Bowling Green, on the 6th day of March, 1833, to keep a tavern in New Salem, Illinois, said license to continue twelve months. The license specifies the rates to be charged. Breakfast, dinner or supper to stage passengers, 37½c; breakfast, dinner or supper to others,

25c; lodging per night, 12½c, and the price per half pint to be charged for liquor, ranging from whiskey at 12½c up to French brandy at 25c. This is interesting as indicative of the law and practice in Illinois seventy-five years ago. Students of Lincoln's life know that this license was a part of the "store" outfit in which Abraham Lincoln was a disastrous partner, the debt of which became a long burden to him. On the reverse side of this appears a typewritten, underscored, modern use of the same, the perpetrators of which wisely concealed their identity. It is a curious illustration of the long bow which the partisan can draw. We quote the comment in full as an illustration in logic:

"This confirms the much debated question that one of the greatest men, 'Lincoln,' in the history of our nation, considered liquor a good thing. An occasional drink will make the great still greater. Try it."

You don't say! And this is the whole foundation of the saloonkeeper's consolation, that his business is justified and the traffic in intoxicants endorsed by Abraham Lincoln. We cannot tell our readers where to secure copies of this valuable souvenir for the information is withheld. We will carefully file it in our Lincoln collection, not only on account of its antiquarian and historical interest, but as a comment on the current logic in the political arena of the United States, A. D. 1908.

At a recent oratorical contest in connection with a large educational institution the question was so stated as to bring out the *"pros"* and *"cons"* of the prohibition problem. It was purely an academic debate under the auspices of an educational institution, and still the disputants were allowed to present absolute contradictory statement of "facts," facts too easily ascertainable. What vitiated this college debate typifies a more vicious habit of newspapers. Whether there is more or less crime in certain given communities under the "dry" regime, whether there is more liquor sold, for instance, in Kansas, now than in former days, whether the business interests of certain towns have suffered, trade diminished, and real estate depressed by the adoption of the "dry" policy, are matters that would seem to be quite within reach of the investigators, matters of figures which are easily ascertainable. These are matters of practical sociology quite within the province of academic investigation. Is it not possible for one or more educational institutions of high standing to establish a "commission" or a "committee of investigation" to look into the figures, the investigation to be governed only by figures and facts and not by theories? In order to make the figures more authoritative, the field for investigation might be selected after consultation with say, the representatives of the Brewers' Association or any of the more stately "personal liberty" organizations which feel that the present phenomenal tendency to eliminate the saloon out of American society is a menace to freedom and to democracy, which is the boast of our country. The sociological department of any university that will undertake such laboratory studies as this will make a great contribution to current statecraft. We would like to see the territory most confident put in evidence by the "Wet" advocates in this way, and we would like to have the "Wet" advocates represented on the commission by an academic man named by themselves, if such can be found. Let the ascertainable facts be stated and certified to according to court standards of evidence that the jury, composed of the American voters, may render a verdict based on the evidences.

A Fourth of July Speech That Was Not Made

Although the senior editor is safely ensconced on his happy shelf at Tower Hill, with no noise to remind him that it is the Fourth of July except the feeble crack of the most innocent type of fire crackers from which the small boys have not wholly escaped, the speaking habit pursues him and he finds himself thinking out the Fourth of July speech that will never be made.

The speech, as all good Fourth of July speeches should, would begin in the reminiscent mood and would tell of the first public appearance of the orator as the reader of the Declaration of Independence out of Squire Evans' Wisconsin Statutes as it rested on the top of a barrel, when he was a little more than barrel high. Next, of the grandest Fourth of July celebration in his life, perhaps in the life of the nation, when at Vicksburg, in 1863, the "Boys in Blue" entertained, and the poor starved "Boys in Gray," who that morning had surrendered, were the guests. The meagre Confederate diet of mule beef and wormy peas was replaced by an abundance of good hard-tack, "sow belly" and coffee. One more Fourth of July presents itself as material for the speech, the celebration held near the old picnic ground where the Declaration of Independence was read to celebrate "When Johnny Comes Marching Home."

But this, like all proper orations, must have present application, and should call the patriots to book. How is it today?

How potent is the spirit of 1863 and 1865, to say nothing of 1776, in the lives of the celebrants of 1908? Much was said in the preparation days of the "sane Fourth," but sanity is not a negative quantity. To cease firing toy pistols, to suppress the cannon cracker, for those who ride to refrain from running over those who walk, does not make a "sane Fourth," though the insanity is aborted. Stupor is a more alarming symptom than raving. Idiocy is more hopeless than inebriety. To have a sane Fourth implies more than reducing the Fourth of July to the inane levels of the fourth of June or the fourth of August.

The "sane Fourth" implies a mind, a thinking mind, an awakened conscience, a deliberate cherishing of ideals, an heroic taking account of stock, a searching of the soul, a reconsecration of the individual to the community.

A sane Fourth should make us ashamed of narrowness, proud of the ambitions that are not carnal, of the wealth that is not material. The sane Fourth should enlarge the boundaries of our sympathies, make us more generous towards ideas, less afraid of theories, less confident of "our party" and "our sect" because in the vocabulary of the fourth day of July the words "party" and "sect" do not appear.

This Fourth of July speech, like all proper speeches on similar occasions, should end in prophecy, should indulge in hopes, and set the eagle flying high and far into the realms of the future. So we end with the hope that brains and not money will be the most potent forces in the coming presidential campaign; that argument and not abuse will characterize the coming stump oratory. Let us hope that the voters will gratefully recognize the fact that honorable men lead all the tickets. Taft, Bryan, *et al.*, are men worthy of confidence, gentlemen that may well sit at home tables, men of pure speech, of clean lives, temperate habits.

Furthermore, let us hope that the questions of the future, not the blunders of the past, shall engage the attention of orator and of voter. On the fourth day of July the cowardly fear of words should be exorcised. Socialism, Anarchy, Single Tax, as well as Democracy and Republicanism, are words to be reckoned with. They represent noble contentions; their errors are to be confuted; their truths to be recognized.

Let us further hope that the rights of the black man and the little brown brother, as well as of the blessed mother and the gracious sister, will receive their full share of attention and that these rights may be advanced at the coming November election.

Let us hope that tariff reform may come speedily to our nation, that more "wet" territory may be dried at each succeeding election, that integrity, not prosperity, may become more and more the quest of the American voter, realizing, as he should, on the highlands of the "sane Fourth" that the power and perpetuity of a nation never have depended and never will depend in the future on its power to grasp, but always on its power to grant, to serve.

But, after thinking this speech all out, the orator has concluded that if opportunity served it would be better to read Walt Whitman's "By Blue Ontario's Shore," instead of delivering the oration.

Nothing is so contagious as enthusiasm; it is the real allegory of the tale of Orpheus; it moves stones, it charms brutes. Enthusiasm is the genius of sincerity, and truth accomplishes no victories without it.—*Bulwer Lytton.*

I pray not that
Men tremble at
My power of place
And lordly sway.
I only pray for simple grace
To look my neighbor in the face
Full honestly from day to day.
—*James Whitcomb Riley.*

THE PULPIT

The Present Status of the Pragmatic Movement.

By G. R. Dodson, Ph. D.

(READ BEFORE THE WESTERN UNITARIAN CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, MAY 20, 1908.)

Philosophy, the result of man's attempt to comprehend himself and his world, is a living thing and can be understood only as a movement. It has been admirably defined as a "progressive effort toward a fully articulated conception of the world as rational." It is a series of approximations toward the perfect truth. As the sciences grow, philosophy, which synthesizes their results, is enabled to revise and correct its conception of the world. The history of philosophy is a history of progress. Real advance is ever being made in problems and theories, one-sided views of life are corrected, all standpoints are seen to have their relative justification, old confusions are cleared up, and the contribution by each of the great systems of philosophy toward a knowledge of the all-embracing truth is gradually appreciated.

Something like this is true of each particular philosophy. It is not a static, unchanging thing, but undergoes ceaseless revision and development. The system of Hegel, e. g., is not a crystallized form, but can be properly described only in terms of life; it is transformed and developed by its interpreters in many different ways. A great thinker often announces a fruitful conception which he overworks and which in his exposition is connected with other ideas with which it is not necessarily involved. This makes work for the logicians and critics, who can never be too acute and thorough-going. Though seemingly destructive, they are necessary agents of progress, for it is they who disentangle ideas that are jumbled together and distinguish that which is confused, thus breaking up complex problems into simple ones, and making clear at last just what each constructive thinker has contributed to the progress of thought.

As there can be no "faith once for all delivered to the saints," so there can be no system of philosophy that will remain undeveloped and unrevised. The Kingdom of Heaven is not the only thing that is like a mustard seed. All our ideas are as seed put in the ground, and the original form of a philosophy is only its first phase, the beginning of its life. This is well illustrated by the history of pragmatism; for although first clearly set forth by Charles Peirce in 1878, and applied to philosophical and religious problems only since 1898, pragmatism already has a history. Its story is one of life and development, and the object of this paper is to give the present status of the pragmatic movement. If, therefore, any one hearing of pragmatism should proceed to investigate with the hope of finding a perfectly definite thing bearing that name, he would be disappointed. If he should read Professor James' book on the subject, the first edition of which was printed in June, 1907, and think that so late and authoritative a statement would definitely inform him, he would be very far wrong. For in these days we make thought-history fast, and now that philosophers have not only monthly journals, but at least one semi-monthly technical publication, criticisms and replies follow one another in rapid succession. It must be remembered that discussion is the philosopher's laboratory, and only those who follow these technical discussions ever really understand the situation. Indeed,

only in this way do the founders of the systems, the men who write the books, come to understand the subject themselves. For no matter how acute a thinker's intelligence, in the first exposition of his view certain problems will almost inevitably be treated together which are really different, and non-essential and irrelevant matters will be introduced which detract from the clearness of the statement and prejudice the public either for or against his cause.

This has happened in the case of pragmatism. Professor James, while criticising his critics for not having a sufficiently ready intelligence and for failing in generosity, admits that he is partly responsible for the misunderstanding of which he complains, since he acknowledges that he has used language that is too slipshod and that in his exposition he has connected pragmatism with a lot of opinions with which it is not naturally implicated. The result is that some people accept or reject what they suppose to be pragmatism because they like or dislike these opinions. The difficulty, however, is not merely with these incidentals, but with pragmatism itself. According to its representatives, no one understands the subject but themselves. This in itself is a very signficant fact, and I cannot think that the fog is wholly in the minds of the critics. When after years of discussion men of facile minds and good will, men whose business it is to deal with these matters, fail to understand, their failure surely cannot be explained solely on the ground of intellectualist prejudice.

The recent discussion has been very illuminating, and has shown that pragmatism is a name for many different things. Professor Lovejoy has made out at least thirteen different pragmatisms, and Professor McGilvary, in a special article on English pragmatism, has dissected out of the confusion a number of different views and attitudes toward life. In the present situation, therefore, to say that one is a pragmatist is not to convey any definite information. In order to understand such a statement it is necessary to know which of the many theories that have received this new name the speaker has in mind.

Let us look at the matter more closely and see what we can do as fog dispersers in this region of thought. As originally set forth by Mr. Charles Peirce thirty years ago, pragmatism was a doctrine concerning the meaning of ideas. According to this eminent logician, our beliefs are really rules for action, and a clear thought of an object is really an understanding of how to act in its presence. Our conception of an object is simply our conception of the sensations we can expect from it or of what we ought to do about it. Think, e. g., of a rattlesnake, a tennis racquet or a dynamite bomb, and you will realize that a clear idea of these things is simply an adequate idea of how to use them or to escape the danger their presence brings. The meaning of an object is thus to be found in its effects, or in the responses it calls forth. Twenty years later, in 1898, Prof. Wm. James applied this principle to religious beliefs, and since then he has extended it to philosophy. For this zealous apostle, pragmatism is (1) primarily not so much a philosophy as a method, a habit of mind, an "attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." This, which has been called "the laboratory habit of mind," is, of course, old. "By their fruits ye shall know them," is a maxim that comes to us from old time. And Plato has explained at great length that the man who really knows an implement is, not the painter who reproduces its likeness in his picture, nor even the artisan who made it, but the man who knows how to use it. But, besides being a method, pragmatism is for Professor James also (2) a theory of truth and (3) a theory concerning the structure of the universe, the theory that reality is still in the making, that the universe, instead of being complete, is unfinished and growing in all sorts of places, the processes of our human consciousness having a creative part. This last phase of the subject will be passed over in this paper. For though as a metaphysical doctrine of the unreality, the indeterminateness and openness of the future, it bears upon the question of the freedom of the will and has certain interesting theological implications, it is not the center of interest in present discussions, is not what is generally in people's minds when they speak of pragmatism, and we shall be able to consider it more profitably when we have attained clear ideas of the pragmatic method and theory of the nature of truth.

Pragmatism is first of all a method of distinguishing really significant propositions from those without meaning. Of the value of this method Professor James has the highest opinion. "It is astonishing," he says, "to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence." This is a pleasing prospect. If, by a simple and easy method, it can be shown that many ancient and difficult questions are unmeaning for the reason that it makes no difference to us whether they are true or not, we are obviously dispensed from the labor of inquiring into their truth. Unfortunately, however, the proposed method is not only no royal road to a solution or disposal of philosophic problems, but it is no road at all, for the reason that the method is not one but two, and when these two have been disentangled, it is clear that there is no help in either.

Peirce's use of the pragmatic principle was clear and unambiguous. The meaning of an object, he says, consists in the effects we may expect from it, in the practical reactions it demands, in the responses that are appropriate when we come into its presence or have to do with it. When, however, this test is used to determine the meaning of judgments, the case is less simple. It is not enough to state that the meaning of a judgment consists in its consequences, for, as the logicians have been quick to point out, the cases in which the consequences come whether the judgment be believed or not must be distinguished from those in which the consequences come only when the judgment is believed to be true. Thus, the statement that cyanide of potassium is a poison that causes instant death is one that holds good regardless of the opinions of the person who puts it to the proof. Not even a Christian Scientist could avoid the consequences. On the other hand, optimistic and pessimistic views of life are practically resultless when they are regarded in an idle, speculative way. But when they are seriously believed in they produce the most momentous consequences, profoundly affecting the emotional and practical life. Regard men as merely half-tamed gorillas, moved principally by greed and fear, and you get results, some of which will appear to justify your theory. Believe, on the other hand, that men are the sons of God, that they will respond to the appeal of reason and love, think of the universe as a divine order in which the only appropriate life is one that is controlled by the highest human ideals—live by this as a working theory, and you will find it full of significance. It will have a meaning for you which it would not have if you did not believe it. The consequences of a proposi-

tion and the consequences of belief in a proposition are, therefore, wholly different things, but Professor James, in his application of the pragmatic test, has not kept them apart. So long as the ambiguity is not noted, the method seems very effective. It is easy for a lively pragmatist writer to ignore the consequences of belief and show that the philosophic and religious theories which he does not like are truly ridiculous. Looked at in an unsympathetic way, the most venerable ideas do indeed appear insignificant. To those who have no affection for them and who do not accept them as true, they seem irrelevant, they make no difference. Since the facts are what they are and these theories alter reality not one whit, they are pragmatically condemned. On the other hand, if belief is taken into consideration, it is obvious that no idea that men have ever cherished or taken seriously to heart is without significance, and the method cannot be used to distinguish propositions that have meaning from those that have not. We shall not know what pragmatism as a method is until its representatives tell us which of these two theories of meaning they adopt. We may join with Professor Lovejoy in calling for an election between them, and agree with him that probably neither choice will be found welcome. "For all the charm and impressiveness of the theory arises out of the confusion of its alternative interpretations. It gets its appearance of novelty and of practical serviceableness in the settlement of controversies from its one meaning; and it gets its plausibility entirely from the other. But (when the distinction is made) in the sense in which the theory might be logically functional, it seems hardly likely to be plausible; and in the sense in which it is plausible, it appears destitute of any applicability or function in the distinguishing of real from meaningless issues." That is, if pragmatism chooses the first theory of meaning and ascribes importance and significance only to those propositions which enable us to predict events that will come even if these propositions are not believed, the theory will not be of much use, since nothing can pass this test except such scientific laws as those through which we can foretell eclipses, practically all the working hypotheses men live by, fight over and die for being reduced to nonsense, for the reason that they have no results at all unless they are believed in. And if the other choice is made, again we are not helped, since all views of life are full of meaning to those who take them seriously and believe them true.

So much, then for the first pragmatism, the method. It may be noted in passing that the way in which it has been disposed of illustrates the value of that criticism which consists in the making of distinctions. Our thought is often a blur because we are trying to think together things which do not belong together, and the greatest service that can be rendered in such cases is to have these confused components of our ideas distinguished and set apart. The task that confronts us in the consideration of the pragmatic notion of truth is the same in kind, though far more difficult. Indeed, one bright woman, who has listened to some of these discussions, says she now knows why Pilate did not wait for an answer. It should be remembered, however, that it is not the philosopher's fault that the problems he deals with are hard to answer. He can be held responsible only for doing his best. Now it is over this question of the nature of truth that the battle rages, for here is the storm center of interest, and it is chiefly in the discussion of this subject that the pragmatists complain of being misunderstood. And, while all men are concerned, the outcome of the debate is of vital importance for those who as ministers of religion conceive that a large part of their business is the learning and teaching of truth. Such learning and teaching is not merely our privilege; it is our life. It may be frankly admitted that Truth, Truth with a capital T, is an idol of our tribe. The conviction that truth is, that it is discoverable, that to learn, teach and apply it is one of the noblest and most salutary things a human being can do, is one of the assumptions on which our lives rest. This idea fills us with enthusiasm, inspires our studies and professional work, and whatever threatens it threatens the heart of our higher life. If, as the pragmatists say, truth is no longer a distinct category, but merely a form of the good, if ideas are merely useful or expedient rather than true, it is obvious that much of our enthusiasm has been foolish and we must change our tone.

Of course, when the pragmatists attempt to establish a new view of the nature of truth, it does not occur to us that they mean to deny its existence. Nevertheless, they have a way of speaking about it that alarms our instincts.

The situation is as follows: The ordinary, intellectualist view is that truth is a matter of agreement of our ideas with an objective order, that this order is something to which our thoughts must conform, if they are to be true. That is, certain things have happened, and certain processes go on, events have a certain sequence; thus, we say, Cæsar lived, the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection, Henry is in Berlin, the date of Deuteronomy is about 620 B. C. These things being so, if I think they are so my thought is true. It is hard to see how anything could be simpler. But the pragmatists make difficulties and offer a view they consider to be more concrete, in the exposition of which they fill us with uneasiness by seeming to give aid and comfort to those who have no intellectual conscience and who play fast and loose with truth. We have observed the progress that has been made by men like Faraday and Darwin, constructing theory after theory, and then ruthlessly crushing in their beautiful promise all these intellectual constructions that do not agree with or reflect the processes they are meant to explain. And we see that the lack of this intellectual piety in many people, their preference for ideas that are merely pleasing or that legitimate their prejudices, and their failure to acknowledge their obligation to find out what has been and is and to accept what is proved to be true regardless of its disturbing effect on their traditional beliefs, has filled the world with war and is still the cause of endless strife and mental confusion.

It is, therefore, naturally disconcerting to read in the lectures of Professor James that "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process: the process namely of verifying itself, its veri-*fication*." * * * Truth is *made,* just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience. * * * This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. The truth of a state of mind means this function of *a leading that is worth while.* And when much is said about truth being what gives "the maximum possible sum of satisfactions," about the true being *"only the expedient in our way of thinking,"* in spite of the fact that the pragmatist acknowledges the coercions of the world of sense and of abstract relations and feels as much as anyone "the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations," we are not satisfied, since we cannot help feeling not only that it is the

incidental features of truth which have been emphasized, but also that all this will tend to strengthen that mere wilfulness in thinking of which there is already too much in the world, and that it will benefit none but those who are ever looking for some justification of their determination to hold to cherished beliefs in the absence of evidence and even in the face of contrary evidence.

When, impelled by such interests, we subject the pragmatist theory of truth to close scrutiny in order to determine its meaning and probability, we find, as in the case of pragmatism regarded as a method, a radical ambiguity. There are many passages in Professor James' book that, taken by themselves, would indicate that he maintains the view that truth is wholly within human experience, a view which he disclaims as absurd. Yet these misleading passages are there, and the fact that they stand side by side with other statements which teach a different doctrine has confused the readers of this brilliant and fascinating book. This has come out clearly in recent discussions, and since my purpose is to make plain how pragmatism has gradually been forced practically to give up its case, I propose to give a resumé of the course of these discussions touching this main point. Herbert Spencer somewhere complains that he found Plato uninteresting reading, and objects particularly to the dialogue form in which his philosophy is cast. But, as I have said, philosophy is essentially a dialogue. It is only through discussion that we become clear as to our own intent or can know the mind of others. The old Greek philosophers wished to clear up the subject as they went along, and not pass over any points that were obscure or that failed to secure the assent of both parties. The method today is to write a book and then reply to the critics in the technical journals. And even in the book the views of opponents are discussed, so that the dialogue is preserved in the substance, if not in form.

It was a great day in Athens when Socrates could be pitted against some famous philosopher, and it is a great thing for us that this question has been discussed by able men on both sides. I am sure there is no better way to clarify the situation than to extract from the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods" the following passages from a controversy between Professor James and the clearest and most brilliant of his opponents, Prof. J. B. Pratt, of Williams College.

To this conversation of Socrates and Protagoras let us now attend. Professor Pratt first calls attention to the fact that, while pragmatism identifies the truth of an idea with the process of its verification, it is also spoken of as being verifiability, which is a very different thing; and he properly insists that the issue between pragmatism and intellectualism cannot be perfectly clear-cut if these two views are confused. The latter conception of truth as verifiability is not pragmatic, for pragmatism says truth is a process, an event, and "verifiability is not a process, is not included within any one's experience, but is a general condition or set of conditions which transcends every single finite experience. It is not a 'felt leading,' it is not a 'form of the good,' nor a 'satisfactory working,' nor any other kind of experience or experience-process. It is a totality of relations which are not within any finite experience. It is a present condition of the idea, not something that happens to it. It is not 'made'; it is already there. Verification is one thing; verifiability is another." The pragmatist must choose, for it is as impossible to identify truth with both "as it is to be both a pragmatist and an intellectualist at the same time. The pragmatist cannot hold them both; he cannot say truth is altogether within experience and truth transcends experience." * * * "That being the case, there can be no doubt, after all, as to the fundamental pragmatic view of truth. Truth for the pragmatist does not mean verifiability, it means the process of verification. It is wholly within experience."

This, of course, turns out to be as foolish as it at first appears. For it is clear that a theory which reduces everything to psychology, though it may properly speak of satisfactory and successful experiences, cannot consistently use the word verification at all. A simple case is used to illustrate the difference between the pragmatist and the ordinary view. "John thinks Peter has a toothache; the object of John's thought is Peter's present experience; and, as a fact, Peter has a toothache. Now the intellectualist's notion of truth is this: that John's thought is true *because its object is as he thinks it.* Now let us apply the pragmatic meaning of truth to the same situation —remembering that truth here means a 'form of the good,' the 'useful,' 'efficient,' 'workable,' 'satisfactory,' the process of verification. The truth of John's idea about Peter's experience, therefore, according to the pragmatist, *consists in* its satisfactoriness to John, in its successful leading, in its verifying itself. If it works, if it harmonizes with John's later experience of Peter's action, if it leads in a direction that is worth while, it is true (a statement to which, indeed, all might assent), and its truth *consists in* this working, this harmony, this verification process. John's thought, the pragmatist insists, *becomes* true only when it has worked out successfully, only when his later experience confirms it by being consistent with it—for remember, truth is not verifiability, but the *process of verification.* Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. At the time when John had the thought about Peter, the thought was neither true nor false, for the process of verification had not yet begun, nothing had as yet happened to the idea. To be sure, Peter had a toothache, just as John thought, but, all the same, John's thought was not true. It did not become true till several hours afterward—in fact, we may suppose, not until Peter, having cured his toothache, told John about it. The thought, 'Peter has a toothache,' thus, as it happens, turns out not to have been true while Peter actually had the toothache, and to have become true only after he had ceased to have a toothache. It became true only by being proved true, and its truth consisted in the process of its proof. One might perhaps be tempted to ask what it was that was proved, and to say to the pragmatist, either this satisfactoriness, this successful leading, is a proof of something outside John's immediate experience, something by which his idea is to be judged and justified (in which case truth ceases to be mere verification process and becomes at least verifiability) ; or else it is merely John's subjective feeling of satisfaction and of successful leading and consistency, with no reference to anything else to justify it—in which case it may indeed be pleasant and good, but it is hard to see why it should be called *true.* For, suppose that at the same time with John's thought, Tom thinks Peter has *not* a toothache. Suppose that, being a little stupid and perhaps a little hard of hearing, he misinterprets John's actions and expressions, and that later on he is assured by some one equally misinformed, that Peter certainly had no toothache. His thought thus works out, is successful, harmonizes with his later experience, is to him genu-

inely verified. The whole matter ends here and he drops the question completely, never investigating farther. Were the thoughts of both John and Tom true?"

So our Protagoras, and he imagines his opponent replying, "No, Tom's thought was not genuinely verified. Only that thought was really verified and therefore true which *would have* worked out *had both been verified sufficiently.*" But this reply is unsatisfactory. "For what do you mean by *sufficiently?* Sufficiently, for what? To argue thus would be to presuppose a criterion (apart from the leading of the thought) to which the thought must correspond if it is to be true. If you distinguish between a genuine verification and one that is only subjectively satisfactory, you appeal to some other criterion than the process of verification—in other words you go over to the intellectualist's point of view. If, on the other hand, you stick to your pragmatic criterion and say that the truth of the thought consists in *actual* satisfactoriness, then the question becomes pertinent: Were the thoughts of both boys true? Obviously they were, for both worked, both were satisfactory, both were verified. Hence it was true at the same time and in the same sense that Peter had a toothache and that Peter had not a toothache. Nor is there anything surprising in this, *if truth is nothing but a particular kind of satisfactory experience.* The principle of contradiction has no meaning and can no longer hold if truth be altogether within one's experience."

When I read these words, which so perfectly expressed my difficulty, I wondered what the answer would be. We did not have to wait long. Professor James promptly replied that he was misunderstood, saying, "Whether such a pragmatist as this exists I know not, never having myself met with the beast." He rejects most emphatically what we thought was the pragmatic theory of truth, and makes this statement: "Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one hand, and a reality outside the idea on the other. This relation, like all relations, has its fundamentum; namely, the matrix of experiential circumstance, psychological as well as physical, in which the correlated terms are found imbedded. * * * What constitutes the relation known as truth, I now say, is just the existence in the empirical world of this fundamentum of circumstance surrounding object and idea and ready to be short-circuited or traversed at full length. So long as it exists and a satisfactory passage through it between the object and the idea is possible, that idea will both *be* true, and will *have been true* of that object, whether fully developed verification has taken place or not."

This statement is certainly explicit and clear. It fully recognizes that truth is a relation between the idea and the objective order. And in an article in the *Philosophical Review* for January, 1908, on "The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders," Professor James is even more emphatic. He says the pragmatist is necessarily a realist in his theory of knowledge; he "calls satisfactions indispensable for truth building, but expressly calls them insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality he assumed were cancelled from his universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about." This seems to state with perfect clearness that truth is not found within any human experience, but transcends, or may transcend, every such experience. What now does the critic say to this complaint of being misunderstood and to the new position? He does not find it difficult to show that his idea of the pragmatist view of truth is not a caricature. Not only has Professor James said the things attributed to him, but other representatives of the same school have made similar statements. Thus, Professor Dewey has said: "Truth is an experienced relation of characteristic quality of things and it has no meaning outside of such a relation." So Professor Moore: "That which is accepted as real, i. e., as logically real, is one factor *within* the judging process, not something *outside* to which the whole judgment conforms." Mr. Schiller says truth is "a function of our intellectual activity, or a manipulation of our objects which turns out to be useful." But, allowing Professor James to repudiate this view, which he says he never held, the critic asks what is the difference between this latest pragmatist theory *that truth is a relation between an idea and a reality outside of the idea,* and the view he opposes? He asks also if, as the pragmatist now admits, ideas may "be true in advance of and apart from their utility," provided their objects are "really there," how can their truth depend upon satisfactions? For if satisfactions are indispensable to the truth of an idea, it would seem that the idea cannot be true till they are experienced, "and the fact that the object of the idea is really there does not make the idea true." "Thus, John's idea that Peter has a toothache would not be true till John is satisfied, even, if as a fact, Peter actually has a toothache, and although it *is* true at the same time to Paul who is satisfied." * * * "If, on the other hand, satisfactions are *not* indispensable, if truth is merely the condition that makes verification possible, and if a belief may be genuinely true before it is verified and without any one's feeling satisfaction, then it is hard to see that pragmatism has contributed anything in the least original or new to the conception of the truth relation. Will the pragmatists tell us plainly which of these two contradictory views is orthodox pragmatism?"

These long quotations will, I hope, be excused, because they take us to the heart of the subject. The lover of that philosophic diamond, clearness of thought and statement, will find beautiful specimens in Professor Pratt's essays. To arguments so cogent what answer is possible? In the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* for March 26, 1908, Professor James asks, "Would it satisfy the repudiators of the fuller definition if we agreed to let them keep the word 'true' for what they stickle for so exclusively, namely, the more preliminary and objective conditions of the cognitive relation, * * * while the word 'truthful' should be reserved, as having the more concrete sound, for the entire unmutilated notion for which Mr. Schiller and I contend? Mr. Schiller and I would then appear as fighting the battles of truthfulness against truth. The question would be almost purely academic, for in actual life the true and the truthful would usually denote the same body of actual human statements or beliefs. Even now none of the *facts* which either party emphasizes has even been denied by the other party, and the quarrel might have the bottom knocked out of it altogether, so far as related to truth's definition only, by the invention of this or some other pair of technical terms."

Such, then, is what it all comes to, so far as the play of brilliant minds about the subject has been able to show what is really there. About the value of the outcome you can form your own conclusion, after applying either or both of the pragmatic tests,

what difference does it make if you believe it, or what difference does it make anyway?

The critic of pragmatism so extensively quoted in this paper points out, as I think rightly, that "an ambiguity in the word idea * * * is responsible for a great deal of the misunderstanding between pragmatists and anti-pragmatists. The former accept Professor Dewey's definition of an idea as a 'plan of action,' and look upon it as 'an instrument for enabling us the better to have to do with the object and to act about it.'"

Of course, if ideas are to be defined in this way, they can be spoken of as useful and successful, but it seems irrelevant to call them true. A good tool is merely good, not truthful or true. And the usefulness of ideas that are merely plans of action has no meaning apart from their use.

But, ordinarily, when we say that an idea is true, we are thinking not of plans or purposes, but of a judgment that a thing is so. And while we may speak of plans and purposes as wise, successful or good, only judgments can properly be said to be true.

The net result, then, is that of the two views which have been confused in the pragmatist theory of truth, one is admitted to be ridiculous even by Professor James himself, while the other is not different from the view he opposes. And the confusion, it is now clear, is largely due to the fact that when the pragmatists are talking about ideas they are thinking about plans of action, while the rest of us are thinking of statements about the sequence of events and matters of fact. It amounts to this, practically, that if the pragmatists are to be allowed to appropriate the word Truth and give it the new meaning upon which they insist, we shall simply have to find another name for that much more important thing which we have always meant when we used the term. For when we listen to others we are not concerned to hear what they think is expedient or what feels satisfactory to them, but what they consider to be true. It will be long before the pragmatist form of oath, proposed by Professor Royce, will be accepted in any court of justice: "I promise to tell whatever is expedient and nothing but what is expedient, so help me future experience."

It appears, then, that pragmatism as a method for determining the meaning of propositions is not one thing, but two; that the pragmatic theory of knowledge or doctrine of the nature of truth is likewise two; and that when the logicians have disentangled the concepts that have been confused, the significance and promise of this new-old philosophy, which thinks so well of itself, are dissipated into thin air.

As to the third pragmatism of Professor James, his theory of the nature of reality as a temporal becoming and his assertion that "pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism and follow pluralism's more empirical path," it must be obvious that so great a theme cannot be discussed in a few paragraphs at the end of this paper. So far, however, as this pragmatism is a structure resting on the other two, it is discredited by their failure. I must content myself with merely stating that it is not necessarily involved with them, and may logically be held as an independent doctrine by those who cannot accept the pragmatic theories of meaning and knowledge.

Is there then, you ask, nothing at all in pragmatism? Yes, no doubt, if we are allowed to put our own meaning into the word. And I will now briefly explain the sense in which I think clear-sighted men are and must always be pragmatists in religion, in their life-reaction to the world.

The general situation which confronts us all is this, that we are constantly compelled to decide the most important matters in the absence of adequate data. Life is like riding a bicycle; we have to go ahead before we know we are right. Our knowledge is very limited, and we walk mostly by faith. Only comparatively simple facts can be calculated, and our most developed sciences deal with restricted fields. Our specialists know many things about chemical reactions, physical processes, geological changes and microorganisms. Upon applied science our civilization largely rests, and in the growth of science is a great part of our hope for the future. But the larger the scope of a science the more inadequate and undeveloped it is. The sciences that deal with life, such as psychology, ethics, sociology, are not much more than programs, which it is hoped future investigations may fill up. Meanwhile, we have to live now, and it is well to realize that neither science, which is so useful in its way, nor philosophy, which synthesizes the results of scientific investigations, is a complete guide to life. They cannot yet demonstrate to us the nature of reality and the appropriate human reaction. Is the evolving cosmos, this mighty engine of mud and fire, all? Or is there in and through it a God, a life, a spirit, that is at least as great as our ideals of the noble, the good, the divine? Is the universe congenial to our ideals? Is the heart of reality akin to what we instinctively love and reverence? Are courage and faith and hope appropriate, or is the pessimist right? Are we the sole inhabitants of an otherwise lifeless universe? Are we orphans, marooned on this planet? Or is our life in touch with a great life with whom we may have fellowship? Are we mistaken in the sense we have that when we think truly, when we love, when we are loyal to the highest we know, we are living on lines that do not end where our lives end but that in some sense they are the lines of God's life?

Whichever view we take must be taken at our risk. In these matters life is necessarily a venture. It is, as some one has said, a speculation on a grand scale. And it is worth while to realize that certain, absolute knowledge is not to be had; that neither philosophers nor men of science can tell us; that even the founders of the world's great religions themselves knew no more than we, but that they, too, had to make the great venture.

There are many people who do not understand this. They run here and there, go to this church and that, read the new books and investigate the new religions and philosophic fads, in the hope of getting definite knowledge concerning these great themes. But a little reflection ought to show that this is vain. There is absolutely nothing for us but to select a working theory of life, live by it, and take the risk. The Socrates of the Phaedo long ago told us this. "I know," he said, "how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of certainty about questions such as these in our present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft on which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him." (Phaedo 85.)

To be sure, in choosing a working theory of life, we use the pragmatic method and take the one which promises best results. Experience affords some help. In the long past, some theories have been found to be livable, to be, when believed and acted upon, biologically serviceable. More important yet, for we are interested not merely in existence but in noble living, certain ways of reacting toward the world have been found to produce grand and beautiful lives. The results we care most for have been achieved when men and women *have assumed that this world is a place for a manly and womanly* life, when they have taken and kept the way of courage, hope and love, when they have lived in the conviction that loyalty to the highest, even on the part of the humblest, is the supreme good and has more than temporal significance. Our theodicies, we may as well frankly admit it, are all failures. We cannot explain away all the cruelties and brutalities in the universe. Yet in spite of the facts that depress us and the arguments that threaten to reduce us to despair, it is significant that those men have lived most nobly and beautifully, most satisfactorily to themselves and helpfully to others, who have lived as if they were citizens of a moral universe, of God's world. In this spiritual situation we are necessarily pragmatists. Not only is it legitimate to decide which way we shall adventure our lives, but we must do so. And if we are religious men, it is because we have resolved to trust our moral sentiments, because we are following, far-off it may be, but still following, and counselling others to follow those heroic souls who, in the darkest hours and most desperate situations, have said of the God who is a name for our moral ideals, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."

A Voice From the Pews

VII.

It was a happy thought when the pastor of All Souls conceived the idea of a pre-natal-Fourth-of-July-celebration in his church, and the various and varied ideas advanced by the several interesting and thoughtful speakers on that occasion will surely prove to be a goodly-sized lump of leaven in the future ideas and expressions of our patriotism. And while a very large audience listened with keen interest to every word, there was room in the galleries for a few more and the Voice regrets that every seat was not filled. We need just this sort of education as to what patriotism really is, and I only wish that there might have been more young people there, who, like one young man of fourteen who *was* there, may have had similar questions to propound: "They keep talking about a 'sane' Fourth of July, mamma. Now, please tell me just what they mean by that?" he queried only a few days ago. I am sure he'll never have to ask that question again.

The Voice has no criticism to make whatever; it was a most beautiful and impressive service, particularly the memorial words for Grover Cleveland—of which more further on; but it would respectfully suggest that with the return of "all the forces" in the fall we get together Sunday evenings and practice singing our patriotic songs. It is really a matter for wonderment that so few in any assemblage can recall the words of our national songs, and in Europe, when Americans try to sing them, we make of ourselves a "laughing stock" (whatever that really is), because before the "last verse" of any song is reached so few can sing the words. No, our patriotism for so long has consisted of "holler" and gun-powder that we are at sea when it comes to ideas and words.

Each of the five speakers who spoke on Patriotism sounded one dominant note in the chord which pealed "brotherhood," and the speaker who said the memorial words for Grover Cleveland gave us truly a memorable picture of the dead statesman; but our pastor summed up the different definitions of the much-abused word as meaning, in its last analysis, "peace, principle and parts."

Mr. Kent, in his thoughtful five minutes, gave us to see the value and permanency of ideals.

State Senator Clyde Jones emphasized the value of our inherited traditions, and emphasized the necessity for discrimination in the transmission of these cherished traditions, some being useless and outgrown in the present age. "Only the good, the true and the useful should be bequeathed to future generations."

Tudor Apmadoc, the son of our Welsh choirmaster, and the vigorous, artistic son of his poetical, beauty-loving race, defined patriotism as "reasonable and comprehensible love and loyalty, which are learned at the mother's knee: love of, and loyalty to, principle, above all creeds and parties; righteousness for conscience's sake, not for dollars, and in its last analysis, patriotism meant brotherhood."

The main thought left in the writer's mind by Mr. Sumner Soleitt's beautiful talk was that of education as an antidote to poverty and a preventive of crime, while Jane Addams, always thoughtful and pertinent in her remarks on all subjects, gave "Self-Government" as a leading factor toward patriotism: "A trying to find the proper machinery with which to work out the ideas transmitted by our ancestors—make them work out in this complex time and nation of 'teeming nations.'" Miss Addams emphasized the influence of the small parks and playgrounds and cited a marked diminution in juvenile crime and arrests since the establishment of these beneficent institutions in her ward.

But the one "talk" of all of these inspiring ones that caused the writer to give thanks was that sweet and simple estimate of the dead ex-president given by Mr. Boyden. The story of a side of his life which it was not given many to see, told so significantly, was a gem of peculiar oratory. And the statement of Mr. Cleveland's purity of mind and cleanness of speech is a testimony that the Voice hopes may find large circulation. If any one can tell me why men, young and old, and alas! many women, find pleasure in obscene stories, I shall be grateful. I have tried to see wherein the merit of that particular brand of wit could be found and so far have failed to discover it. The statement made by his close friend, Mr. Boyden, that "never in all their intimate intercourse did he hear Grover Cleveland utter a word that his wife or mother might not have heard," is surely one that all should know and emulate. Another element of Mr. Cleveland's power as seen by Mr. Boyden was his strict regard for honesty and truth. I think all who were moved to go "to the synagogue" last Sunday will always give thanks for the uplift of that rare hour.

VIVA VOCE.

He who floats with the current, who does not guide himself according to higher principles, who has no ideal, no convictions,—such a man is a mere article of the world's furniture—a thing moved, instead of a living moving being—an echo, not a voice.

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THE FIELD

"The World is my Country, to do good is my Religion."

Foreign Notes

THREE BASES OF THE CHURCH.—Apropos of the religious problem now under discussion in Geneva, a recent writer in *Le Signal* outlines succinctly three fundamental ideas around which a church may be organized: the national, the intellectual, and the moral. The resulting organizations, though he does not explicitly so name them, might well be designated as the church of the past, the present, and the future.

The oldest, the national, was that of the ancient peoples, the worship of a racial or tribal god, with the commingling, or confounding, of the functions of priest and ruler. The middle ages saw its marked revival in Florence under Savonarola, and the sixteenth century in Geneva under Calvin. The racial or national tie was the fundamental one, and citizenship and church membership were coextensive and coequal, every citizen being de facto a member of the church and every professor of the official religion a unit in the nation.

Next comes the intellectual church. This arises wherever there is a commingling of people of diverse religions. Intermingling and assimilation take place, racial lines and characteristics are gradually obliterated, and the crucial question comes to be not, Who are you? but, What do you believe? On the answer depends whether you are one of us or a heretic.

The church based on belief has reached its highest development in modern times, great religious communions being built upon adherence to creeds, while the other ideals play a secondary part. So far from the racial or national idea prevailing, the members of any sect or denomination may be scattered throughout the world; and it is not purity of the moral and religious life whatever his beliefs, which is the primary characteristic of the church member, but orthodoxy of belief whatever his moral character.

The third stage or degree in the church's development, says the Swiss writer referred to, is as yet in the germ. No church so far as I know has officially adopted it. It is the union of those who live an actively religious life and devote themselves to good deeds, moral helpfulness and coöperation, regardless of all creedal tests or race limitations. Of this coming church it has been said: In the church of the future no one will ask, What do you think of Jesus Christ? but, What do you want to do for him? In other words: Whatever may be your intellectual attitude, believer, denier, or free-thinker, if you desire to be an active worker in the field of moral and social betterment, if you wish to contribute effectively to bring in the kingdom of God on the earth you are one of us.

The church at Geneva, he says, is an interesting study in this respect. Almost as much as the Jewish people it has rested on the three bases just indicated, emphasizing by turns all three of them. Better than the church of any locality, it can, thanks to Calvin, claim the traditions of an epoch when, as the "Protestant Rome" and leading center of the reformation, it was a veritable City Church. As the outward storm and struggle subsided, schisms arose and the intellectual church, with its dogmatic basis, gradually disengaged itself, or nearly so, from the nationalist element. Today, in the arena of the ecclesiastical constitutional assembly, the two tendencies are at odds. It is much to be desired that within the great circle of the national church the smaller circles of the dogmatic churches (an intermediate and transitory element) should form a federation. On what practical and positive basis? That of moral action. This is the only natural solution, which will not fetter action nor the spiritual life; and these, in any case, will escape any administrative organization.

It may be objected that this is to reduce the church to the level of a mere benevolent society. In a sense, yes, but on what other basis would you place the church? Are not our pastors already, in their contact with people, struggling with the material and moral difficulties of life more and more—and this is perhaps more characteristically true even now in Geneva than elsewhere—true ministers of the Gospel, physicians of souls, and workers for moral and social betterment?

Let all who desire to unite personally or indirectly in this work be members of the church, regardless of confession or nationality. Do you say that is little? It is much, it is indeed all that one can expect of a church: To spread the good tidings, to comfort souls, to sustain the feeble and encourage the strong, so that all may progress toward the ideal life proclaimed by Jesus!

Is that a contemptible aim, not worthy to serve as the cornerstone of a church at once national and pragmatic? It does not seem so to me; quite the contrary.

So speaks this Swiss brother, Ad. Ferrière. It is interesting to compare his utterance with that of another Mr. Ferrière, which I outlined here a week or so ago. We think the former might find in America, for his encouragement, more than one church organization on just such a basis as he here suggests. One feels much inclined to send him All Souls bond of fellowship, but supposably he is looking for a federation of churches, not a single congregation. M. E. H.

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The Tower Hill Summer Encampment

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Anticipating the questions of those who are looking for a suitable place to spend vacation months, the following statement is prepared with the approval of and after consultation with cottage owners, the resident settlers on the Hill, in whose hands the management virtually rests.

History: The site of the Tower Hill Encampment was once within the limits of a busy pioneer village and river town, Helena, Iowa County, Wisconsin, which went down with the advent of the railroad and the establishment of Spring Green, leaving Helena at one side. On the top of the bluff was situated at one time the "melting house" of a thriving shot tower (hence the name), the hot pellets falling through a shaft of some two hundred feet into a well on the level of the Wisconsin river, which sweeps around the base of the hill, where the finishing house was situated; the product was shipped by boat in the ante-railroad days down the river to St. Louis and elsewhere. The property was bought in 1890 by Jenkin Lloyd Jones, William C. Gannett and S. S. Hunting, with the double motive of rescuing a picturesque and sightly hill, with the surrounding country of great beauty, from vandal fires and wanton neglect, and with the hope of establishing a quiet retreat, where tired ministers, teachers and other city-bound people might find an escape from the noise, the hurry, the strain, the style, the exactions of fashion and the burdensome conventions of society, and for a time enjoy at minimum cost communion with nature, with a few master minds, and, when profitable, with one another. These aims have been kept strictly in view. Life on the Hill is kept very quiet and simple. The residents retire early and the privacy of the cottages is respected. "Plain Living and High Thinking" has been the aim. The men go in their shirt sleeves, women in plain calico or its equivalent, and children in their bare feet. It is no place for Saratoga trunk displays and impedimenta; fine dresses can better be displayed elsewhere.

The Encampment was laid out and the company incorporated by Robert L. Joiner, County Surveyor, and the original clearing and initial work was carried on under his direction and with the coöperation of the Lloyd Jones brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, and James Philip and David Timothy, of the Hillside Valley, whose support has been an important element in the growth and strength of the Hill colony. The movement has also enjoyed from the start the coöperation and sympathy of many other neighbors in the vicinity and in the village of Spring Green.

The Plant: By virtue of certain real estate transfers made last year, the Tower Hill Pleasure Company now owns, without debt, with the exception of an unpaid bill for the reroofing of the company houses last summer, a tract of land of about sixty-five acres, effectively enclosed, abundantly shaded by native and planted trees, with an adequate reservoir, from which is piped to the various buildings the purest water, drawn from a well sunk into the Potsdam sandstone, and yielding scarcely a trace of organic matter. It owns a dining room, ice house, pavilion with a seating capacity of 250, with fireplace, class room facilities, one cottage and two long houses for rent, servants' quarters, etc., etc. All the buildings are wire screened and are insect and rain proof. Tower Hill and its river surroundings afford exceptional opportunities for the artist with paint brush or camera, or for the amateur geologist, botanist, ornithologist, etc. A well tilled garden and an adequate dairy supply the table.

Private Cottages: Shares in the Tower Hill Pleasure Company are sold for twenty-five dollars ($25) each; this entitles the holder to a building site, the cottage being private property and subject to sale, though the title to the land remains vested in the company. At the present time the encampment contains sixteen (16) such cottages.

Finances: The expenses of the encampment consist of the wages of one man, who, in addition to the care of the property, gets up the wood, fills the ice house and maintains the garden, and the incidental expenses necessary to keep the water works and the public property in order. To meet these expenses there is paid to the company treasury an annual sustaining tax of twenty dollars ($20) from each cottage owner, and 10 per cent of the gross earnings of the dining room and laundry and the Longhouse rentals.

The Tower Hill Summer School

In the furtherance of the above object, the Summer School held its first session in 1890, its meetings for the first year being held in the school house in Hillside Valley. The Emerson Pavilion was completed and dedicated in time for the season of 1891. Since then the sessions have been held continuously on the Hill, with the exception of 1893, the World's Fair year, when the Encampment was closed and the study classes were held in Chicago in "Unity Building," a boarding home for friendly visitors to the fair, which was rented, equipped and sustained by a Tower Hill committee, and whose net earnings greatly aided in the first equipment, rendered possible by certain "loans" made by a few of the residents, which were never collected and have long since been forgiven and forgotten.

The object of this School from the beginning has been:

First, to give an opportunity for coöperative study of Bible and religious programs from a devout but progressive and scientific standpoint, with the normal school purpose of enabling the students to carry the result of their studies into Sunday School and home instruction. It was organized around the seven years' course of study in religion, printed below.

Second to deepen the acquaintance with master bards, particularly those most in need of interpretative helps and on that account most in danger of being neglected, viz., Browning, Emerson, Whitman and their fellows.

Third, such study of nature—rock, flower, insect and bird—as the surroundings invite and encourage.

Fourth, the furnishing of such popular and illustrative lectures as the resources of the Hill, the State University and other available material would offer.

Fifth, the holding of such public assemblies, Sunday gatherings, basket meetings, as would interest, socialize and edify the neighbors in that country side.

In all five of these directions the work has been carried on with increasing success, each year adding something to its potency and interest. The Grove Meeting Sundays, two or three in a season, have been greatly appreciated by a constituency representing a circle of attendance whose radius is thirty or more miles in extent.

The conductor of the School has always been Jenkin Lloyd Jones, and with the exception of the first years he has given the lessons in religion and the major part of the work in poetry, though a list of those who have assisted in the class room, with object lesson and lecture, would make a long one, too long to be here inserted; an imperfect list would be unfair.

This year's work will be given to the fifth year in the Seven Years' Course, studying the books of the New Testament in their chronological order, as follows.

CLASS IN RELIGION—FIFTH YEAR.

The New Testament.

Introductory.
John, Jesus, Paul (the three boys).
Paul's Letter to the Galatians.
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Second Thessalonians.
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Second Corinthians.
Romans.
Philemon.
Colossians and Ephesians.
Philippians.
Mark (4 lessons).
Matthew.
Luke.
John.
Genealogy and Birth Stories.
The Beatitudes.
Sermon on the Mount.
Parables (2 lessons).
The Women of the Gospel.
The Resurrection.
The Jerusalem Beginning of the New Movement (2 lessons).
The Pastoral Epistles — I. and II. Timothy and Titus.
Epistle to the Hebrews.
The Catholic Letters I. and II. Peter, James and Jude.
I., II. and III. John.
The Book of Revelation.
The Apocryphal New Testament.
Review and farewell for the season.

The following partial list of reference books is recommended:

Bacon's "Introduction to the New Testament," "Twentieth Century New Testament," "A Wicket Gate to the Bible," with charts by W. C. Gannett; "Life in Palestine When Jesus Lived," by Carpenter; "A History of New Testament Times in Palestine," Mathews.

"The Gospel and Its Earlier Interpretations," Cone; "Introduction to the New Testament," Julicher; "Jesus," Bousset; "The History of Early Christian Literature," Von Soden; "The First Three Gospels," Carpenter; "The Prophet of Nazareth," Schmidt; "The Synoptic Gospels," Cary; "Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, Romans and Philippians," Drummond; "Hebrews, Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon, the Pastoral Epistles, James, Peter and Jude," Cone; "The Johannine Literature, Acts," Forbes.

"A Biblical Introduction," Bennett & Adeney; "The Apostolic Age," McGiffert; "The Formation of the New Testament," Ferris; "Christian Origins," Pfleiderer; "What Is Christianity?" Harnack; "Paul, the Man, the Missionary, and the Teacher," Cone; "Mark," Solly; "History of the Higher Criticism," Nash; "History of the Textual Criticism," Vincent; "Biblical Theology of the New Testament," Gould; "Theology of the New Testament," Stevens; "Sources of Our Knowledge of the Life of Jesus," Wernle; "Beginnings of Christianity," Wernle (2 vols.); "Apologetic of the New Testament," Scott; "Jesus Christ Before His Ministry," Stapfer; "Jesus Christ During His Ministry," Stapfer; "The Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ," Stapfer; "Jewish People in the Time of Christ," Schurer; "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," Edersheim; "Ecce Homo," Seeley; "New Testament Times in Palestine," Mathews; "Kingdom of God," Bruce; "Teaching of Jesus," Wendt; "Social Teaching of Jesus," Mathews; "The Apostle Paul," Farrar. The first four very cheap books will make an adequate equipment.

Daily Program. 8:30 to 9:30, nature studies; 11:15 to 12:30, Bible work; 7:30 to 8:30, three times a week, poetry work, special lectures; 8 p. m. No study work on Saturday. Sundays on Tower Hill not given to public meetings are days of quiet, with abstinence from boisterous games or activities that call for extra work for men or horses.

Dates and Prices

Tower Hill Encampment, July 1—September 16; Tower Hill Summer School, July 19—August 23; Women's Congress, August 21, 22, 23.

Board at the dining room is furnished at four dollars and a half ($4.50) a week; room in Long Houses, with double bed, $3 per week. For the season there are always some cottages that can be rented, but applications should be made early. So far as the capacity of the laundry permits washing will be done at usual schedule rates. Transportation between Spring Green and the Hill, a distance of three (3) miles, 50 cents; trunks, 50 cents; valises and similar packages, 15 cents. Round trip from the Hill to Spring Green and return, when seats can be spared in the buckboard, 25 cents. Teams for special trips and rides, carrying six (6) passengers, can be ordered at any time from Spring Green livery at the rate of a dollar an hour. Registration fee, five dollars ($5), including all classes and evening lectures. Family tickets, seven dollars ($7); single admission, 25 cents.

General Information

Spring Green is the railroad, postoffice and telegraph station. It is situated on the Prairie du Chien division of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, one hundred and eighty (180) miles from Chicago. Those wishing to reach the Hill with least delay should notify by letter in time for the buckboard to meet the train, though a livery at Spring Green is always accessible on short notice. For further particulars address Mrs. Edith Lackersteen, Abraham Lincoln Centre, Chicago.

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Fernwood	1892	Miss Wynne Lackersteen
Maxwelton	1892	Mrs. A. L. Kelly
Leafring	1892	Miss Cordelia Kirkland
———	1894	Rett E. Olmstead
Lanier	1896	Miss R. A. Hatherell
Wahzedah	1901	Miss E. H. Walker
Welawiben	1903	Miss Bertha Howe
Blaencathal	1901	T. R. Lloyd Jones
Pine Lodge	1905	Harry Hyman
Brantwood	1905	Mrs. Mallory
Cedarknowe	1905	Granville R. Pike
Waldesruh	1905	Mrs. Irwin Rosenfels
Hotel Extreme	1892	Tower Hill Pleasure Company
Unity Club Long House	1892	Tower Hill Pleasure Company
Woman's Resolve Long House	1892	Tower Hill Pleasure Company
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